Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 51

Issue 4

Article 8

1963

Sentencing the Recidivist--An Ethical Dilemma
Theodore Sager Meth
Seton Hall University

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Meth, Theodore Sager (1963) "Sentencing the Recidivist--An Ethical Dilemma," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol.
51: Iss. 4, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol51/iss4/8

This Special Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Special Comment
By THEODORE SAGER METH*
SENTENCING THE RECIDIVISTAN ETHICAL DILEMMA
This article is a study of the sentencing function of the federal judiciary in a very limited class of cases-those where a draft
registrant refuses to accept civilian work in lieu of military training.
Prior to February 4, 1949, the classification of registrant under
the Selective Training and Service Act, the forerunner of the
present Universal Military Training and Service Act,' was not
a matter of judicial review On that date, however, the Supreme
Court handed down the decision in Estep v. United States,2 making
it clear that draft board action must meet the same standards
of due process as other administrative action.
Therefore, Jehovah's Witnesses, who had constituted 7.4 per
cent of all conscientious objectors convicted from October 16,
1940 to June 30, 1945,3 came to be recognized as being entitled to
the I-0 classification accorded those who, "by reason of religious
[are] conscientiously opposed to particitraining and belief,
pation in war in any form.' 4 Having filed a special form, 5 and
having been determined by the local board or appeal boards to
induction
be entitled to a 1-0, a registrant would "in lieu of
to perform for a period equal
be ordered by his local board
to the period [fixed for active military training and service]
such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the
[might]
national health, safety or interest as the local board
deem appropriate."
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Seton Hall Umversity School of Law.
62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. §451 f f (1945).
2327 U.S. 114 (1946).
3

Elliot, Crime inModem Society 193 (1952).
62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. §456 (j) (1951); The willingness of Jehovah s
Witnesses to fight ina theocratic war was held not to vitiate their objection to
participation
in human wars, Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
5
Selective Service System Form No. 150 (4th ed. 1959).
602 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. §456 (j) (1951).
4
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The civilian work ordinarily was and is employment at a state
or county mental hospital. The regulations permit employment
at non-public charitable institutions, but cases where this has
been utilized are rare. 7 The registrant is given an opportunity
to submit types of work which he is willing to perform. 8 If a
Jehovah s Witness elects volunteer work for the Watchtower
Bible and Tract Society, the parent organization of his religious association, it will not be acceptable to any local board.
Deeming that accepting any other work would be inconsistent with
his religious convictions, since it would be equivalent to employment by an "idolatrous nationalism," the Witness will invariably
refuse to accept the form of work which the local board orders.9
This refusal constitutes a crime.
It is important to see how the criminal chain is linked together. The Act provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Any
person charged as hereto provided with the
duty of carrying out the provisions of tbis title,
or
the rules or regulations made or directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such
duty
shall, upon conviction in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, ° be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine of not
more than $10,000, or by both.i"
The failure or neglect to obey the order to perform civilian work
is treated exactly life refusal to register,12 or refusal to report
13
for or submit to induction. The same penalty applies to each.
The Jehovah s Witness now faces prosecution. He cannot
attack his classification on the many procedural grounds that are
7
Selective Service System Reg. 1660.1 (1951) [hereinafter cited as S.S.S.].
United States v. Capehart, 237 F 2d 388 (4th Cir. 1956), upheld tns practice;
c.f. United States v. Copeland, 126 F Supp. 734 (D.C. Conn. 1954); United
States v. Lebherz, 129 F Supp. 444 )D.C. N.J. 1955).
8 S.S.S. 1660.20(a).
91 S.S.S. 1660.20(c).
OSee 18 U.S.C. §3231.
1i 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. §462 (1951); S.S.S. 1660.30; Johnson v.
United States, 285 F 2d 700 (9th Cir. 1960).
12Michener v. United States, 184 F 2d 712 (10th Cir. 1950).
18 United States v. Palmer, 223 F 2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1955). The Palmer case
illustrates the repeatability of the crime. The court held, and the Supreme Court
demed certiorari, that the fact that the defendant had been convicted for failure
to register and had served a prison term did not prevent a subsequent conviction,
after a registration, for refusing to report for induction. And see, United States
v. Phillips, 143 F Supp. 496 (N.D. WVa. 1956), where conviction for failure
to report for civilian work followed an earlier conviction for failure to report
for induction.
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available to a registrant who is classified I-A.' 4 He claimed a
I-0 and received it. Although by his beliefs he is a minister,
along with all other members of his congregation who have been
dedicated, he is probably not entitled to a ministerial classification under the Act, 15 because the quantum of secular work he
performs so greatly outweighs that of his religious labors.' 6
What kind of person is this young man now facing a prison
term? From a sociologist's or criminologist's point of view he is
likely to be a physically healthy, moral person who has never
before been charged with any crime or juvenile offense. He comes
from a stable home and community, and is of average intelligence. He has made his decision voluntarily, without involving
associates. He is neither psychotic, neutrotic, nor socially maladjusted, although he does subscribe to some views which are
different than those of the general community in regard to
saluting the flag,' 7 the observance of Christmas, and blood transfusions.' 8 He supports his parents, or, if married, a young wife
and child, by an employment calling for some substantial ability
and character. Almost all his leisure time goes into religious
work. Social prognosis is good. 19
Prognosis is good except for the fact that he will, almost
inevitably, have to plead guilty and face a prison term averaging
18 to 24 months. After he has served this term, subject to parole
privileges, he can and may be ordered to report for civilian work
again,20 and then the cycle may be repeated until he is no longer
eligible for military service. 2' Since he will evaluate the prison
regime from the perspective of the person who is not normally
a prisoner its special evils-contact with recidivist offenders,
homosexual involvements, and stultifying physical discipline14 Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960); Chemekoff v. United
States, 219 F 2d 721 (9th Cir. 1955).
15 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. §456(g) (1951).
i6 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); see United States v.
Stepler, 258 F 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1958), where the bald contention of a local
board that "a member of Jehovah s Witnesses does not qualify for a IV-D classification (inmistenal) for the reason that he does not have the training and qualification of an ordained minister" was held erroneous. The test is purely a test of
time. Wiggins v. United States, 262 F 2d 113 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Hurt, 244 F 2d 46 (3rd Cir. 1957).
x7State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 819 U.S. 624 (1943).
Is State v. Pemcone, 87 N.J. 463, 181 A. 2d 751 (1962).
'9 Glueek, S. & E., 5000 Criminal Careers 281-82 (1930).
20
United States v. Palmer, 223 F 2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1955).
2
1Sibley & Wardlaw, Conscientious Objectors in Prison (1945).
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probably will not destroy him. He may engage m evangelism
among his fellow prisoners. But he does have a painful experience, and he, his family and the community suffer an extended
hiatus in his useful life as a member of society.
We now have come to that point where we see the registrant
as he is seen by the sentencing judge. The judge has a probation
presentence report before him, he has the statute, the regulations and the jacket of the court proceedings. He knows the
offense, the man, and the punishments. He has only to fit them
together.
What practical alternatives are before him? We suggest that
there are five:
(1) Send the offender to a maximum security penitentiary
22
for five years.
23
(2) Send him to a penitentiary for exactly two years.
(3) Send him to a penitentiary for a period of ten or more,
but not in excess of eighteen, months.
(4) Send him to a local federal detention center for a nominal term of weeks.
(5) Suspend the operation of sentence and place him on probation for a term of months or years, or simply suspend sentence
altogether.
Little need be said about the first alternative. Assuming that
this is a first offense, no judge, however sincere a patriot, would
consider imposing the maximum penalty.
The second alternative is the one most customarily invoked,
and is defended as a "logical" course. In effect one says, "Young
man, you must serve in the armed forces in a combatant or noncombatant capacity for two years, under present regulations, go
to work at a mental hospital for the same period or go to jail
for two years." Once the superficially geometrical symmetry of
such a rule is exposed, however, its faults all appear. Prison is
22
This would be the maximum penalty also for the offense of recruiting
soldiers to serve in an army hostile to the United States, (18 U.S.C. §2389),
or of organizing a white slave nng (18 U.S.C. §2421). Such a term has been
held not to constitute cruel and unusual pumshment within the Constitutional inhibition. Kramer v. United States, 147 F 2d 756, cert. den. 324 U.S. 878 (1945).
The usual rule, that excessive sentences are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals, has been applied in this field as well. Johnson v. United States, 126 F 2d
242 (8th Cir. 1942).
23 Statistics show little utilization in peace time of three or four years as an
alternative.
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neither a statutory nor a moral equivalent to service pro patria.
Indeed, imprisonment will make the registrant unacceptable for
24
future military service on a voluntary basis
The sentencing function is unique. It is not in lieu of anything, not in lieu of military service or in lieu of civilian-workin-lieu-of-military-service. The application of a two-year rule as
a plausible parallel would turn our federal judges into vending
machines which dispense a fixed punishment for a fixed crime
regardless of all modern concepts of the function of sentencing
as a warning to the offender and to society, and as a device for
reform and rehabilitation. It would leave the judiciary, in one
specialized class of cases, with the duty to vindicate the public interest without contemplating rationally what would effectively
vindicate the public interest.2 5
If, then, we reject the second alternative, if only in favor
of any period other than a mechanical two years, whether it be
23 months or 25 months or what have you, we are faced with
the ethical heart of the question as we examine the third alternative, i.e., a period of from 10 to 18 months imprisonment,
subject to reduction by the grant of parole.
The defendant is a man likely to commit only one crime, the
one for which he now stands convicted. Uniquely, he is ready,
at the very moment he stands before the bar of justice, to commit the crime again and agaml This situation is without parallel
in criminology, except in cases where psychopathology is involved.
In a word, his conscience makes him appear to be out of his
senses in the view of ordinary society. The ordinary citizen and
first offender who, unlike this defendant, will salute the flag,
send Easter cards, (and keep his Bible safely in a drawer), may
steal, assault or cheat, but may be very confident at the time
of sentencing that he will "never do it again" if he is "given another chance", and, in light of the usual presentence report, the
court will probably agree. But here, in the case of the Jehovah's
Witness, the judge may as well discard the investigation report
and all conventional presentencing practices: he is almost assured that a recidivist stands before him. At the same time as he
1622 (44(a); and current armed forces admassion regulations.
25Elliott, Conflicting Penal Theones m Statutory Criminal Law 1931,
Kirchwey, Cnrme and Punishment, 1 J. Crm. L., C. &P. S. 718-34 (1911).
24 S.S.S.
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recognizes this fact, he also realizes that the concept of recidivism,
so appropriate in regard to a crime like counterfeiting, is mapposite to the task before him.
What, then, is the defense of a sentence of imprisonment
in excess of 10 months? The usual justification is that imprisonment for a substantial period publically and dramatically illustrates and underscores the conviction of the nation, for whose
sake and with whose ultimate authority the judge acts, that each
citizen has a duty to defend and protect the republic and that the
duty is of a comparable ethical order to those duties imposed by
the conscience of the individual.
In such a view, the purely criminal aspects disappear, or more
properly are only utilized for the convenience of statutory
classification. The issue becomes one of the relation between
a member of a society and the rational order of society itself.
The law cannot ignore defendant's civil disobedience; to do so
would not only encourage others to be disobedient and so weaken
the social structure and the will of the people to perpetuate
their own defense, it would constitute an abrogation by society of
its duty to those who voluntarily (using that term m its largest
sense) make their legally required contribution to the defense
of the community. One sentencing judge in a case of this sort
said that any other action than some imprisonment would be the
road to anarchy.
The consciousness of the philosophical character of the act
of sentencing was apparent in the remarks attendant to the imposition of sentence in a recent unreported case, United States
v. Korner26 Here, one thoughtful judge, faced with the sentencof God. But when a group of men, either m the form of a family or a tribe, or a
26 United States District Court, New Jersey, Cnm. 241-61, Dec. 1, 1961;
excerpted with permission of Hon. Reymer J. Wortendyke, Jr., who said, m part:
Counsel, I am debating m my mind whether or not I should disqualify myself
m this case. I happen to be a veteran and I happen to be a native-born American
citizen. I happen to have been called upon many times to administer to those who
have not had the privilege of being born m this country the oath of allegiance,
the language of wich is before me. As you may recall, m that oath an opportunity is accorded to those who by reason of religious teachings are unwilling to
engage m physical combat.
The new citizen swears that "I will perform work
of national importance under civilian direction when required by law." Far be
it for me to pass upon my religious conviction or to sit m judgment upon the
dictates of the human conscience.
I suppose that man residing alone, not as
a part of human society, not as a part of the group, would have a complete right
to espouse and exemplify the principle which Mr. Korner has just stated, that
man recognizes only the dictates of ins conscience as interpretative of the law
(Continued on next page)
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ing dilemmas of this particular class of cases, chose to impose imprisonment, but for a moderate term.
The fourth alternative, which we have suggested, that of
sending the defendant to a detention center, as distinguished
from a federal penitentiary, for a nominal term of weeks, up to
24 weeks, would equally follow from Judge Wortendyke's reasoning. The difference in time and place of confinement would be
simply a difference in the weight given to the utility of a penal
term, in regard to the impact on the general community. One
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

larger subdivision, come together for their mutual well being, for their mutual
protection, for the advancement, if you will, of the Will of God, irrespective of
the embodiment of God as it may reside in the imagination or mind of any individual, enter into an agreement of which the Mayflower Compact, for example,
is an instance, it seems to me that the benefits which each individual is expected
to derive from the resultant social organization necessarily imposes upon the
individual the obligation to protect the group and keep alive the opportunity for
each individual, including the particular one, the opportunity-the privilegeof exercising the dictates of his conscience under God.
"My difficulty is this: What am I going to do with a person who takes this
position? He is an American citizen. He says, in effect, 'I don't recognize Amencan laws except the law of God. When I said I should disqualify myself, I am
wondenng whether my views are colored by being a veteran. I believe in God
and I believe in the human conscience. I believe that heaven is not something
that is going to come somewhere in the future, but it could exist right here on
this earth if everybody did to Ins neighbor as he would like to be done by. That
is my creed. If I weren't too old, God willing I'd be in the service now again,
not because I believe the service does anybody any good, but I believe that an
American citizen owes a nmmal recognition of Is obligation to his country.
"When I received this presentence report, after I studied it thoroughly, I put
in my handwriting at the head of it
., 'How can I avoid impnsomng him?'
Then after that, after I perused and studied Is presentence report, I discussed it
with the probation officer, as I do in every case.
I cannot understand, in
view of the teachings of the Jewish religion, in view of the teachings of the
Christian religion, in view of that thread of the obligation cast by Alnghty God
through the human conscience on every individual to serve his fellow men, how
service in an institution such as that suggested by the [Local] Board in the case
of this defendant could be in conflict with Jehovah s will.
I don't feel that
I have been shown, in view of the fact that defendant's religious duties have not
in the past occupied all of his employment time, how his compliance with the
order of the Board would substantially obstruct his continuance in his religious
duties by the same time performing the civilian service winch he was directed to
perform. I cannot imagine anything more exemplary of a truly humanitarian
Christian or Jewish or any other religious spirit than that of serving the sick in
their tribulation. Indeed, I believe that Christ healed the sick on many occasions.
"What am I going to do? I have no doubt that Mr. Komer s conscience is a
healthy, normal conscience. I have no suspicion in my mind under any circumstances that he would do violence to a fellow man.
What bothers me is this:
If a man can stand before a Court created under the laws and constitution of the
nation of wich he is a citizen and say, 'My conscience tells me that I should not
obey thi law, then it seems to me that the very roots of the tree of law and
justice are destroyed.
"It is the sentence of this Court that you be committed to the custody of
the Attorney General of the United States for confinement to a jail type institution for a penod of one year.
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can believe imprisonment is the right course and still believe it
27
should be relatively mild.

One sentencing alternative remains a suspended sentence
with or without probation. Since the offender is dedicated, barring a radical change of conscience, to recidivism, probation
could have no effect; no probation officer would be willing to
tamper with conscience or with religious views, and so probation
would be tantamount to a simple suspension of sentence. But
if that is to be the result, why should the case be prosecuted in
the first place? Not to obtain a conviction on paper, surely;
in almost every instance it is an aforegone conclusion that the
defendant will plead guilty. Within his social sphere a conviction probably carries little stigma, indeed, it may carry a degree of honor. Though imprisonment may make much less impression on the general public than is thought by its advocates,
it surely does more to that end than the bare fact of a conviction.
The Government has another alternative, one which would
not bring the judiciary into play at all. Upon investigation into
the sincerity of a given registrant's adherence to views forbidding
him to accept civilian service in lieu of induction, it could decide
not to prosecute at all. Not every offense against a nation must be
prosecuted. Where insincerity or conscious draft-dodging is not
involved, does it matter if a few persons escape service altogether?
At least so long as the numbers involved are small, is prosecution
as a matter of principle justified, when viewed in the light of the
costs of judicial and penal administration and of the utility to
28
the republic which is predictably involved?
The decision not to prosecute is, however, an ehtical decision, no less so than the decision as to sentencing. The decision
must in each case derive from a balancing of individual and social
27

Shorter periods than six months give rise to administrative difficulties, and
also, from the point of view of the defendant, they must be examined in light
parole regulations and practices.
of prevailing
2
sCompare, Act No. 4729 of 27 July, 1957, Gaceta Official No. 8147, Prohibiting The Sect Known as Jehovah's Witnesses, of the Dominican Republic
which, in spite of Article 8, par. 5 of a Constitution which guarantees freedom
of conscience and worship, cnminal penalties are imposed on Witnesses on the
ground that refusal to bear arms is a device for undermining the foundations of
the State.
The official position of the United States, at least as it is expressed in the
views of the administrative agency which is responsible for the Selective Service
System, appears in "Let the Puishment Fit the Crime," Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1957, Selective Senvce (Wash., D.C.), in an article by General Counsel,
Col. Daniel 0. Omer. The article advocates a uniform sentence of two years.
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needs and, hopefully, from a procedure which gives genuine
weight to the convictions of the individual as they are reflected
in his behavior. It is not, we submit, enough to say that he exhibits anti-social behavior when he refuses to accept civilian
work, unless one also says in what ways, in all other areas of his
life, he exhibits socially approved and useful behavior.
Perhaps the ethical dilemma disappears precisely when we
lift our sights above the bare act of sentencing for a given crime
and consider sentencing as itself a necessarily ethical act. That
act calls upon knowledge, judgment, a set of valuations and a
spiritiual quality usually denominated as charity. If a judge
"knows" the defendant and the community to which he relates,
is not afraid to make a decision in regard to the defendant s
future, and has discovered and will apply a rational set of relationships among the values of the community, he is in a position
to act ethically even if his act is not one which would be universally applauded. For that act to acquire a transcendental and
therefore-in a sense-epic or national character, he need only add
a general deep affection for all people which has as a part a deep
affection for the defendant as one member of humanity. The
unusual circumstance that the defendant will repeat his crime then
ceases to be like a lost piece in a puzzle-something that brings the
participants to a halt, and becomes simply part of the factual
whole which is the subject matter for an ethical judgment.
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